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The Piracy “Threat” in Perspective
John Patch
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Alejandro Colas and Bryan Mabee, eds., Mercenaries, Pirates, Bandits and Empires:
Private Violence in Historical Context (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).
Benerson Little, Pirate Hunting: The Fight Against Pirates, Privateers, and Sea
Raiders from Antiquity to the Present (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2010).
Martin Murphy, Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money: Piracy and Terrorism in the
Modern World (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).
Martin Murphy, Somalia: The New Barbary? Piracy and Islam in the Horn of Africa
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).

A

plethora of books on piracy has emerged since coverage of this historical
scourge spiked after 2007. High visibility incidents off Somalia, including
ship seizures and attacks against very large crude carriers and American-flagged
merchant vessels, raised the perceived stakes and focused international attention on the Horn of Africa. Books of varying credibility flooded the market.
This essay reviews five recent works to evaluate their utility and contribution
to the body of knowledge on this arcane aspect of modern conflict.

Know Thy Nonstate Actor
In Mercenaries, Pirates, Bandits and Empires: Private Violence in
Historical Context, editors Alejandro Colas and Bryan Mabee provide a selection of essays that challenge the traditional international relations assumption
that state actors hold the monopoly on coercive power. By far the most theoretical
of the works reviewed herein, it is of limited utility for decisionmakers confronted with maritime security challenges. Colas and Mabee assess that groups
historically profiting from conflict—pirates, privateers, mercenaries, warlords,
bandits, and smugglers—have done so outside the margins of state authority. In
doing so, the editors successfully introduce the essays in a context that squarely
argues that traditional conceptions of force, territory, and authority often do not
explain or otherwise illuminate how private “for profit” violence, especially the
John Patch is an Associate Professor of Strategic Intelligence at the U.S. Army War
College and Adjunct Faculty at the American Military University. He is a retired Navy
Intelligence Officer and qualified Surface Warfare Officer and Joint Specialty Officer.
He writes on maritime and defense issues for various periodicals and serves on the
Editorial Board for the US Naval Institute’s Proceedings.

142Parameters

Review Essay: The Piracy “Threat” in Perspective

organized kind, can result in localized and even regional threats to maritime
security and trade.1 Exploring the theory behind the phenomenon of piracy is
useful to students of national security, but the lack of specific recommendations
related to managing these nonstate “threats” leaves the reader unsatisfied. In
fairness, the editors never claim to offer hard solutions, but instead hope to
“show how the broad historicization of private violence can give depth and
perspective on understanding private violence in the present.”2
The essays do in fact provide a coherent account of the historical use of
private violence by nation-states. Examples of French and British-sanctioned
privateering from the 14th to the 19th centuries are analyzed in parallel to contemporary uses of private security contractors (PSCs). Indeed, governments
have, and continue to, sanction private violence when it is in their interest to
do so. One dangerous complexity relevant to contemporary Somali piracy is
that at least some of the early piracy incidents in Somali waters were justified
as legitimate, sanctioned efforts to enforce its sovereignty. While easy profit is
clearly pirates’ prime motive, one must appreciate that this was also the object
of the parties carrying out state-sponsored maritime depredation historically.
While privateering is an anachronism, government use of PSCs is commonplace, even by the United States, and that practice contributed materially to
the decline of Strait of Malacca piracy in the last decade. Hence, perspectives
and motives matter greatly and must at least be accounted for intellectually as
Western states struggle to contend with piracy. Indeed, piracy is not as black
and white as most media accounts and pundits assert. Mercenaries, Pirates,
Bandits and Empires successfully relates the theme that piracy and privateering
were not simply incidental developments, but were “intrinsic to the genesis
and development of the structures of modern international relations.”3 It ends
with the conclusion that sensitivity to the variegated ways nonstate entities can
either promote or reduce security is important to appreciate as the edifice of the
nation-state becomes less relevant in the modern world.

Motive for Maritime Violence
Martin Murphy, a well-respected expert on modern piracy, provides
an excellent analysis of maritime violence with two recent books. In Small
Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money: Piracy and Terrorism in the Modern World,
Murphy’s title captures the essence of his argument. His book sets out to
answer questions surrounding the form of contemporary piracy and the nature
of maritime terrorism, as well as their similarities and alleged links. These are
important questions, because current maritime strategy, doctrine, and threat
assessments often cite both phenomena as critical concerns and exploit them as
part of the justification for acquiring sufficient naval force structure.
Murphy challenges common assertions that both piracy and maritime
terrorism are serious threats, instead determining that they are both relatively
unlikely and low impact potentialities. Indeed, his in-depth analysis of piracy’s
costs reveals a spectrum of estimates, many of which seem fanciful to Murphy.
While human, financial, and opportunity costs are obvious, Murphy deems the
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actual impact of piracy on maritime commerce “miniscule.”4 Murphy further
recommends circumspection with piracy statistics, warning that accuracy and
reliability are problematic and cited figures may not account for regional variations and the logic of incident location (for instance, maritime depredation must
occur in international waters to be considered piracy). Murphy distinguishes
common and organized pirates, categorizing the latter as the obvious greater
threat. With a caveat that the situation might change with little warning, he
asserts, “there is no clear evidence that any pirate group has cooperated with or
has links to any insurgent or terrorist organization.”5 Murphy bases his analysis on group motives and the nature of the activities, with piracy as criminal
behavior and terrorism as inherently political or ideological in its objectives.
Murphy assesses the causal factors relevant to both issues and does find
some similarities in the conditions promoting them—especially the conducive
environment of weak states. Murphy’s study lists piracy’s contributing factors
as strategic geography, jurisdictional seams, a degree of conflict, permissive
local political and cultural environments, inadequate security, and reward.
These circumstances are found in areas other than the failed state of Somalia,
including Nigeria and Southwest Asia. The author sums up piracy as “a global
phenomenon, but not a global problem.”6 In a case study of the Straits of Malacca
and Singapore, where regional cooperative efforts virtually eliminated piracy
in 2005, Murphy cites three reasons for the success: coordinated and reviewed
national, bilateral, and multinational security measures. He also provides an
insightful discussion of the relevant treaties that have supported more effective
international legal regimes for the treatment of piracy and terrorism.
The counterterrorism analyst will also find much utility in Murphy’s
analysis of the potential tactics that maritime terrorists can utilize, including
a rich analysis of their capabilities and limitations. The discussion of terrorist
use of more capable weapons, attributed heretofore to states alone, is particularly valuable as theorists continue to explore the changing characteristics of
modern hybrid warfare. Indeed, Hezbollah’s 2006 use of C802 antiship cruise
missiles against Israeli warships will not be the last example of this change, as
the March 2011 Israeli interception of Iranian C704 antiship missiles bound for
Gaza on a merchant ship illustrates.7
Murphy does not discount maritime terrorism; he simply puts it in perspective. Indeed, his case study of the relatively successful maritime terrorist
tactics of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) is enlightening not only
because LTTE proved a serious threat to the government, but also because
ultimately it was defeated on land—an important theme in all of Murphy’s
works. The author ends his well-documented and scholarly work with the conclusion that the conditions conducive to both piracy and terrorism persist, but
that these exigencies do not present strategic threats comparable to the legacy
Soviet menace and that terrorism at sea will be much less evident than on land,
where targets are more plentiful and offer more psychological impact.
In Somalia: The New Barbary? Piracy and Islam in the Horn of Africa,
Murphy continues his in-depth look at piracy with a focus on its root causes
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in Somalia, comparing it briefly with the 18th and 19th century Mediterranean
Barbary experiences. Murphy’s book contributes a critical element to the
body of knowledge on piracy with an insightful analysis of whether or not the
popular notion of a failed state is a “useful and accurate explanation of Somali
piracy.”8 He concludes, after providing convincing evidence from the 1980s
to the current day, that in fact state failure is not a piracy prerequisite. Murphy
presents a number of factors that do promote piracy in a way that demonstrates
each case is unique. Two years after his 2009 assessment in Small Boats, Weak
States, Dirty Money, Murphy adds “opportunity” to the previous list of factors
common to piracy-prone regions.9 His findings also reinforce other authors’
observations that Somali piracy remains fragmented and relatively unsophisticated, even while enjoying localized political protection from powerful elites.
Perhaps the book’s most important point involves the alleged piracyterrorism nexus. Murphy investigates the merits of arguments that Somali
Islamists have or will benefit from the financial boon piracy has provided to
specific clans along the Somali coast. His assessment finds that the al-Shabab
movement, while of concern, is apparently not interested in highjacking the
purely economic activity of the pirates for jihadist purposes. He also counters a
popular contention by demonstrating that Islamists seem to require a degree of
state order to carry out their agendas, hence preferring weak, vice failed states.
Al-Shabab may not be strong enough to challenge clan support for piracy, regardless. Recent statements by coalition maritime leaders in the region suggesting
that the military treat pirates like terrorists reinforces concerns that while most
credible piracy analysthyasve largely discounted the piracy-terrorism nexrengsome senior leaders still cling to it. Still, Murphy keeps an open mind and a
watchful eye on Somali Islamists.
Finally, Murphy evaluates the international naval response since 2000
and finds it wanting. He raises the uncomfortable assertion that “the U.S. Navy’s
failure, in tandem with its coalition partners, to curb the pirates’ activities raises
doubts about its willingness to devote the resources that are necessary to make
maritime security a reality . . . .”10 He concludes that piracy continues off Somalia
because it has become a well-oiled (if localized) organized crime effort that
benefits from sanctuary ashore, the protection of powerful clan leaders, and a
clear international reluctance to bear the costs of addressing root causes inland.
While the naval task forces have indeed made it harder for Somali pirates to
operate with impunity and pushed them south into the Indian Ocean, Murphy
asserts that any claims of a serious reduction in piracy or effective deterrent
effort from the naval operations are specious.
The author answers the question of the book’s title with a resounding
“no.” He qualifies that surface parallels exist with the Barbary Corsairs, but
that readers should use caution in applying them. His well-documented work
moves far beyond a literature review to provide a fresh study with cogent arguments directly relevant to the current international approach to the problem.
This 2011 work cements the important concepts that Somali piracy remains an
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economic—albeit criminal—activity, motivated by pragmatism and profit in a
society that has yet to fully embrace any jihadist group.

Piracy by Another Name
A 2010 chronicle of the long history of depredation at sea, Benerson
Little’s Pirate Hunting: The Fight Against Pirates, Privateers, and Sea Raiders
from Antiquity to the Present adds a useful work to the bookshelves of maritime
thinkers. Little does a commendable job using historical examples to remind
readers that piracy is not a new phenomenon. Perhaps more importantly, he
takes the opportunity to clarify that the practice of maritime depredation has not
been unique to lawless pirates. Indeed, nations have selectively used the plunder
of an adversary’s merchant fleet as legitimate means of warfare. Little seeks to
provide “a descriptive and democratic history and analysis applied in the end
in the present circumstances of piracy.”11 He begins with a useful discussion on
the definitions relevant to piracy, which in itself can aid maritime analysts in
clarifying assumptions before courses of action or solutions are applied Ttoo
often, pundits have not begun the piracy debate from a footing of rigorous and
scholarly examination of problem definition and context). Little categorizes
groups historically exploiting maritime depredation as “Sea Rovers,” in a deeper
assessment of both legitimate and illicit plunderers of merchant shipping. Some
readers may take exception to this taxonomy, but it serves an important point
in pushing the reader to examine the implications of terminology. Indeed, one
only needs to consider that the US Constitution authorizes Congress to issue
letters of marque and reprisal for attacks on merchant ships to appreciate that
in some cases, one man’s pirate is another man’s privateer.
Little finds enduring themes in his study from antiquity to the modern
day. He finds that “need and greed,” much less so than religion or ideology, are
the historical motives of piracy. He highlights the traditional clamor of peoples
for governments to address the piracy scourge and the general reluctance of
leaders to take on the mission due to prohibitive expenses. Little also stresses the
tendency of states to seek treaties and alliances to attack the problem, observing that these methods typically achieve mixed results. His examples of the
centuries-long blights of Mycenaean pirates, Norse raiders, and Mediterranean
Corsairs are sobering evidence that piracy has never been easily addressed.
Little effectively dissects piracy across the ages to conclude that it is in essence
an economic activity, in that coherent efforts to counter it only come when it sufficiently threatens commerce. The book emphasizes that market forces will have
significant influence on the commercial response to piracy when governments
do not step in—essentially, business will adapt. Little notes that historically,
“with major political and economic transition or breakdown came both the need
and opportunity for sea roving.”12 Add to that the strategic proximity to major
sea trade routes and it becomes clear that the impetus for piracy is recurring and
perhaps inevitable. Notably, he asserts that piracy also remains suppressed only
so long as states apply credible land and naval power to the problem. Hence,
piracy’s root causes lay inland, and Little emphasizes that it “will never be solved
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by capturing or killing every pirate on the sea.”13 He recommends a prudent
mix of international cooperation, economic and security capacity building,
best business practices that include arming merchants, and a credible system to
incarcerate captured pirates. Finally, Little deserves praise for cogently stressing that piracy and terrorism are different phenomena and equating them is at
best naive and at worst a distraction from actual terrorist threats.
In the end, Little does a great service by cementing the truism that
history provides meaningful context and potentially useful perspectives from
which to analyze contemporary problems. Many, if not all, of Little’s observations ring true to the current plague of Somali piracy. Naval leaders and policy
makers alike would do well to consider them as contemporary ways, means,
and ends are evaluated.

A Compendium for Researchers
Perhaps the least satisfying of this group of books is Terror on the High
Seas: from Piracy to Strategic Challenges, edited by Yonah Alexander and
Tyler Richardson. From the title onward, this 2009 work makes the assumption
that piracy and terrorism are closely linked, when in fact most scholarly works
on the alleged “nexus” discount this popular conflation. Upon a deeper reading,
students of maritime security will be unfulfilled, as the two-volume set provides
only brief surface-level analysis before launching into an exhaustive selection
of the documents relevant to maritime crime and terrorism from 1981-2008.
The first volume relates the purpose of the work as a comprehensive
resource on maritime challenges from piracy to strategic security concerns,
based on a three-decade long study at the Inter-University Center for Terrorism
Studies. It begins appropriately with a discussion on terminology, often an
area of confusion with policy makers and military leaders alike. Correctly categorizing maritime violence is indeed important, because policy approaches
and military rules of engagement flow from precise problem definitions. The
volume continues with case studies of maritime terrorism, including the 1985
Achille Lauro and the 2000 USS Cole attacks. Later chapters summarize key
US responses since the USS Cole incident, including organizational, policy, and
legislative changes. The following sections summarize the international and
private industry reaction since 2000.
While serving as an excellent historical overview on the topic, it rarely
provides any insightful analysis of causes, effects, or possible solutions. Perhaps
more egregiously, it mischaracterizes the scope and impact of the potential
threat. For instance, one of several forewords incorrectly relates that, “Like
piracy centuries ago, piracy and other illicit activities today have emerged as the
premier challenge to our current conventional capabilities.”14 The preface also
asserts that al Qaeda remains the “most serious threat to maritime security.”15
Both statements are debatable, and the lack of credible evidence to support
them leaves the reader unconvinced.
For a work this voluminous, the utility of its conclusions are somewhat limited. Alexander provides his well-documented findings in Chapter 1.
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He concludes that, in studying maritime violence, a broad spectrum of actors,
motives, and tactics are apparent; that no comprehensive record of maritime
terrorism is available; that the response by international organizations and governments has been weak; and finally, that the cumulative impact of maritime
terrorism has been “rather serious.”16 Further, perhaps unwittingly, the editors
manage to merge the phenomena of piracy and maritime terrorism, the former
being exclusively criminal in nature. Finally, the later chapters (continuing into
Volume 2) suffer from insufficient context, as they move without comment
directly into the summarized primary source material, which some might find
off-putting. Still, there is some value for the researcher in compiling the more
important documents on piracy and maritime terrorism in one set of volumes.
In the end, the work provides a solid narrative record of the important incidents
and responses to maritime crime and terrorism since 1981, but falls short of
expectations with only limited analysis.

Conclusions
A fair question might be why a review of the current literature on nontraditional maritime threats is useful to the student of policy and strategy. The
answer is both nuanced and important. Land forces need secure sea lines of
communication as an enabler for everything from theater entry, to logistics,
to power projection. Combatant commanders also depend on the peacetime
“shaping” provided partly via maritime engagement and capacity building.
Additionally, America and other great powers enjoy the fruits of global commerce transported largely by sea. Yet, typically, land power theorists simply
assume the United States and like-minded states will vouchsafe maritime
security as a matter of course. The above review should demonstrate the inherently risky nature of that assumption in an era of growing irregular threats and
shrinking navies. As Martin Murphy is wont to remind maritime theorists,
localized maritime insecurity, if ignored for long enough, will likely become a
regional problem. Exploring the nature and characteristics of maritime violence
has its merits, and will serve America well when eyes inevitably turn seaward
for answers.
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